Compensating Victims of War Operations in Libyan Legislation in Light of the Supreme Court’s Ruling

Abstract

The Libyan legislator is keen to meet the requirements of the transitional phase that the State of Libya has been experiencing since the end of the previous regime in 2011 AD.Several laws have been issued related to transitional justice, the most recent of which was No. 29 of 2013 AD, regarding transitional justice. But the executive and judicial authorities were reluctant to implement them. This contributed to withholding its texts from judicial practices, as the Libyan judiciary did not implement these laws at the lower levels. Also, the Supreme Court, as a court of cassation in civil cases, refused to implement them. This is a strange behavior and calls to question its reason, especially the provisions of the law, the direct legal source regulating compensation claims by victims of war operations, are valid and obligatory to implement. This has contributed to the confusion of judicial rulings, whether with regard to determining the source of the state’s obligation to compensate, or determining the competent authority to consider these cases. This research examined the subject in light of the provisions of the Transitional Justice Law and the rulings of the Libyan judiciary, to expand the scope of constructive debate and paving the way for the judiciary to get out of this impasse. The Transitional Justice Law is a real opportunity for war victims to fulfill their rights to compensation if the law is applied correctly, since the provisions of the law guarantee the foundations for assessing legal responsibility, the foundations for compensation, and the ways to require compensation for litigants in an administrative manner that is easier and more convenient than the judicial path.